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pose it. Indeed, cultural orientations so defined are stronger predictors of indi-
viduals' positions than i any other fact about them, including whether they are
male or female, white or black, southerners or easterners, urbanites or country
dwellers, conservatives or liberals. The role of culture in determining attitudes to-
ward guns suggests that empirical analyses of the effect of gun control on violent
crime are unlikely to have much impact. As they do when they are evaluating em-
pirical evidence of environmental and other types of risks, individuals can be ex-
pected to credit or dismiss empirical evidence on "gun control risks" depending on
whether it coheres or conflicts with their cultural values. Rather than focusing on
quantifying the impact of gun control laws on crime, then, academics and others
who want to contribute to resolving the gun debate should dedicate themselves to
constructing a new expressive idiom that will allow citizens to debate the cultural
issues that divide them in an open and constructive way.
INTRODUCTION
Few issues divide the American polity as dramatically as gun con-
trol. Framed by assassinations, mass shootings, and violent crime, the
gun debate feeds on our deepest national anxieties. Pitting women
against men, blacks against whites, suburban against rural, Northeast
against South and West, Protestants against Catholics and Jews, the
gun question reinforces the most volatile sources of factionalization in
our political life. Pro- and anticontrol forces spend millions of dollars
to influence the votes of legislators and the outcomes of popular elec-
tions. Yet we are no closer to achieving consensus on the major issues
today than we were ten, thirty, or even eighty years ago.
Admirably, economists and other empirical social scientists have
dedicated themselves to freeing us from this state of perpetual contes-
tation. Shorn of its emotional trappings, the gun debate, they reason,
comes down to a straightforward question of fact: do more guns make
society less safe or more? ' Control supporters take the position that
the ready availability of guns diminishes public safety by facilitating vio-
lent crimes and accidental shootings; opponents take the position that
such availability enhances public safety by enabling potential crime vic-
tims to ward off violent predation. Both sides believe that "only em-
pirical research can hope to resolve which of the[se] ... possible ef-
fects ... dominate [s] .''  Accordingly, social scientists have attacked
Compare Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086, 1086
(2001) ("[C] hanges in gun ownership are significantly positively related to changes in
the homicide rate .... ), with JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (2d ed.
2000) (presenting evidence indicating that gun control does not save lives).
lan Ayres &John J. Donohue III, Nondiscretionay Concealed Weapons Laws: A Case
Study of Statistics, Standards of Proof and Public Policy, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 436, 441
(1999) (reviewing JOHN R. LOTTV, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (1998)).
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the gun issue with a variety of empirical methods-from multivariate
regression models' to contingent valuation studies4 to public-health
risk-factor analyses."
Evaluated in its own idiom, however, this prodigious investment of
intellectual capital has yielded only meager practical dividends. As
high-quality studies of the consequences of gun control accumulate in
number, gun control politics rage on with unabated intensity. In-
deed, in the 2000 election, their respective support for and opposition
to gun control may well have cost Democrats the White House and
Republicans control of the U.S. Senate.6
Perhaps empirical social science has failed to quiet public dis-
agreement over gun control because empirical social scientists have
not yet reached their own consensus on what the consequences of gun
control really are. If so, then the right course for academics who want
to make a positive contribution to resolving the gun control debate
would be to stay the course-to continue devoting their energy, time,
and creativity to the project of quantifying the impact of various gun
control measures.
But another possibility is that by focusing on consequences nar-
3 See, e.g., id. at 452-56 (exploring the impact of shall-issue laws using multivariate
regression models); Dan A. Black & Daniel S. Nagin, Do Right to Cany Laws Deter Violent
Crime?, 27]. LEGAL STUD. 209, 209 (1998) (finding that right-to-carry laws do not affect
the rate of murder and rape based upon multivariate regression models); Duggan, su-
pra note 1, at 1088 (concluding that gun ownership positively affects the homicide rate
using multivariate regression); Jens Ludwig, Conceaied-Gun-Canying Laws and Violent
Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18 INT'l. REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1998) (using
multivariate regression models to demonstrate that state shall-issue laws have resulted
in increased homicide rates among adults); Carlisle Moody, Testing for the Effects of Con-
cealed Weapons Laws: Specifcation Errors and Robustness, 44J.L. & ECON. REV. 799 (2001)
(reproducing Lott-Mustard results with respecified regression model); David E. Olson
& Michael D. Maltz, Right-to-Cony Concealed Weapon Laws and Homicide in Large U.S.
Counties: The Effect on Weapon Types, Victim Characteristics, and Victim-Offender Relation-
ships, 44J.L. & ECON. REV. 747 (2001) (respecifying the Lott and Mustard regression
model and finding mixed results).
4 See, e.g., PHILIPJ. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS, at vii
(2000) (placing a monetary value on gun violence as a means of documenting how
much gun violence reduces Americans' quality of life).
5 See, e.g., Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factorfbr Homicide in
the Home, 329 NEW ENG. .J. MED. 1084, 1084 (1993) (concluding that the use of illicit
drugs and a history of physical fights increases the likelihood of gun violence in the
home).
6 SeeJonathan Cowan &Jim Kessler, Gun Debate, BLUEPRINT MAG.,July/Aug. 2001,
at 30, 31, 33 (stating that "[i]n November 2000 voters from guln-owning households
made up roughly half of the electorate and two-thirds of them voted for George W.
Bush" and that "[flive of seven NRA-backed candidates for the Senate lost [the elec-
tion]").
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rowly conceived, empirical social scientists just aren't addressing what
members of the public really care about. Guns, historians and soci-
ologists tell us, are not just "weapons, [or] pieces of sporting equip-
ment"; they are also symbols "positively or negatively associated with
Daniel Boone, the Civil War, the elemental lifestyles[ of] the frontier,
war in general, crime, masculinity in the abstract, adventure, civic re-
sponsibility or irresponsibility, [and] slavery or freedom., 7 It stands to
reason, then, that how an individual feels about gun control will de-
pend a lot on the social meanings that she thinks guns and gun con-
trol express, and not just on the consequences she believes they im-5
pose. As one southern Democratic senator recently put it, the gun
debate is "about values"-"about who you are and who you aren't."" Or
in the even more pithy formulation of another group of politically
minded commentators, "It's the Culture, Stupid!"'
This view, if correct, has important practical implications for the
gun debate. If individuals adopt one position or another because of
what guns mean rather than what guns do, then empirical data are
unlikely to have much effect on the gun debate. Instead of continu-
ing to focus on the consequences of various types of regulation, aca-
demics and others who want to help resolve the gun controversy
should dedicate themselves to identifying with as much precision as
possible the cultural visions that animate this dispute, and to formulat-
ing appropriate strategies for enabling those visions to be expressively
reconciled in law.
In this respect, we believe that the academic study of gun control
stands to benefit from an alliance with the academic study of risk per-
ception. Members of the public disagree strongly with experts and
with one another about the magnitude of various societal risks, from
environmental catastrophe to foreign invasion to economic collapse.
Through sophisticated survey instruments, anthropologists, psycholo-
gists, and sociologists have documented the impact that differences in
moral attitudes and cultural orientations have in shaping individuals'
perceptions of these kinds of risks. The resulting cultural theory of
7 WILLIAM R. TONSO, GUN AND SOcIETY: TiHE SOCIAL AND ExISTENTIAL ROOTS of
THE AMERICAN A'Ir'AcHMENTTO FIREARMS 38 (1982).
H See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 452-59
(1999) (asserting that what motivates those involved in the gtn control debate "is their
attachment to competing cultural styles that assign social meanings to guns").
9 Zell Miller, The Democratic Party's Southern Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2001, at
Al 7 (emphasis added).
I These words appeared on the cover of the July/August 2001 edition of Blueprint
magazine, which is published by the Democratic Leadership Council.
MORE STA TIS77CS, LESS PERSUASION
risk," moreover, has important implications for what must be done-
and in particular, what must be said by citizens to one another-in or-
der for such disputes to be definitively settled.1
2
Our goal in this Article is to bring the tools of the cultural theory
of risk to bear on the gun control controversy. Part I furnishes an
overview of the cultural theory of risk. Part II applies the theory to
gun control. In addition to reviewing the fit between the cultural the-
ory and existing literature on public opinion toward guns, we present
the results of an original empirical study that demonstrates that atti-
tudes toward gun control do in fact bear the relationship to cultural
orientations posited by cultural theory. Part III spells out the implica-
tions of this finding for the kinds of arguments and evidence that are
likely to matter in the gun control debate. In Part IV, we conclude
with an exhortation to academics to apply themselves to the creation
of a new expressive idiom, one designed to accommodate respectful
cultural deliberations over gun control.
I. THE CULTURAL THEORY OF RISK
Anthropologists, sociologists, and social psychologists have long
been interested in the puzzling diversity of risk evaluations. Why
might an individual act in an apparently risk-preferring manner in
one setting-say, by climbing mountains for recreation-but in a risk-
averse manner-investing all of her retirement funds in money-
market certificates rather than in stocks-in another? Why do differ-
ent individuals attach radically different evaluations to different socie-
tal risks-of, say, a nuclear accident, a foreign war, or the collapse of
financial markets?
The answer-or at least one powerful answer-is the complexity
and diversity of social norms. Contrary to what rational choice eco-
nomics assumes, individuals do not have generic attitudes toward risky
activities, but instead evaluate them according to context-specific
norms that determine what risk taking connotes about their values
and attitudes. So a person may climb mountains on the weekends to
demonstrate (to herself and to others) that she possesses courage and
physical discipline, and invest her retirement funds in money-market
11 Throughot this Article, the term "cultural theoly of risk" is interchangeably
referred to as "cultural theory."
12 For an overview of the development of cultural theory, see generally Steve Ray-
ner, Cultural Iheoty and Risk Analyses, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83 (Krimsky &
Goldin eds., 1992).
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certificates to demonstrate that she is prudent, responsible, and for-
ward-looking."
Insofar as societies are often the sites of competing norms,
moreover, we should expect systematic variation in-and conse-
quently dispute over-public risk assessments. Acceptance of the risks
incident to nuclear power, for example, might signal confidence in
governmental and scientific authority, man's mastery over his envi-
ronment, and the feasibility of unimpeded private commerce to one
group of citizens while signifying collective hubris, disrespect for the
sacredness of nature, and generational selfishness to another."
The cultural theory of risk, associated most famously with the
work of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky,'5 systematizes the rela-
tionship between risk evaluation, social norms, and political conflict.
That theory sees attitudes toward risk as derivative of social norms. Ir-
respective of what they believe about the actuarial magnitudes of vari-
ous risks, individuals routinely choose to accept some and avoid others
because they believe it would be dishonorable or cowardly or selsh or
base to do otherwise." To the extent that individuals self-consciously
rely on these norm-pervaded evaluations, their attitudes toward risk
can be said to be morally derivative of social norms.
But risk perception can be cognitively derivative of social norms as
well. The risks that we face in our daily lives are far too vast in num-
ber and diverse in nature to be comprehended in their totality. Of all
the potential hazards that compete for our attention, the ones most
likely to penetrate our consciousness are the ones that comport with
our norm-pervaded moral evaluations: it is easy to believe that igno-
ble activities are also physically dangerous, and worthy ones benign.1
7
13 See generally Elke U. Weber, The Utility of Measi.nrig and Modeling Perceived Risk, in
CHOICE, DECISION, AND MEASUREMENT 45, 46 (A.A.j. Marley ed., 1997) (investigating
how individual and situational differences, in addition to the traditional assumption of
universal risk assumption, affect one's perception of risk).
1.1 See generally Ellen Peters & Pattl Slovic, The Role ?f Affect and Worldviews as Orient-
ing Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Poner; 26 .. APPLIED SOC.
PsYciioi_ 1427, 1427 (1996) (examining "the interaction between two psychological
systems-cognition and affect-and their joint influence on perception and accep-
tance of risks, with particular emphasis on the risks from nuclear powe").
5 E.g., MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CUILTURE (1982).
6 e id. at 72-73 (explaining that private individuals "choose not to be aware of
every danger," and that when choosing between risks, "subjective values must take pri-
ority").
17 See id. at 73 ("One salient difference between experts and the lay public is that
the latter, when assessing risks, do not conceal their moral commitments but put them
into the argument, explicitly and prominently.").
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Thus, "moral concern guides notjust the response to risk but the ba-
sic faculty of [risk] perception" as well.'
Because risk perceptions are derivative of social norms in these
senses, it would be a mistake, according to the cultural theory, to see
political controversy over risk as involving mere factual disagreements.
Individuals are primed by norms to perceive certain risks and not oth-
ers as worthy of public attention. When bestowed, such attention
necessarily reinforces the norms that make those risks salient and
denigrates the norms that would fix our attention on some alternative
schedule of dangers and threats. "We choose [which] risks [to attend
to] in the same package as we choose our social institutions."'' Thus,
even when framed in narrowly factual terms, public disagreements
over risks are, in truth, disputes among citizens who subscribe to com-
peting norms and to the conflicting cultural visions that those norms
construct.
The most ambitious version of the cultural theory focuses primar-
ily on three general cultural orientations."' The hierarchical orienta-
tion favors deference to traditional forms of social and political
authority and is protective of the roles and status claims they entail.'
The egalitarian view, in contrast, abhors social stratification, distrusts
the social and political authority structures that rest on such differen-
tiation, and favors collective action to equalize wealth, status, and
power. The individualist view prizes individual autonomy, celebrates
free markets and other institutionalized forms of private ordering,
and resents collective interference with the same.23
Each of these worldviews "has its own typical risk portfolio" that
19 MARY DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEIPTAILIYn ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 60
(1985).
19 DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 15, at 9.
20 See, e.g., Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cut-
tural 'Iheoty oft reference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. RFV. 1, 11-13 (1987) (discussing the
defining characteristics of hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualistic cultures).
21 See id. at 11 ("Hierarchical cultures tavor social conservatism, giving government
the right to intervene in matters of personal morality.").
2 See id. ("[E]galitarians may support intervention in the economy to reduce eco-
nomic difference but not intervention in social life to maintain inequality.").
See id. at 6 ("The social ideal of individualistic cultures is selftregulation."); see
also Peters & Slovic, supra note 14, at 1438 ("[l]ndividualists are said to have concerns
about social deviance only if it disrupts the stability of market relationships or limits
freedom."); Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perce.ption: Who Fears What
and Why?, 119 DAEDALUS 41, 44 (1990) ("Individualist cultures support self-regulation,
including the freedom to bid and bargain.").
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"shuts out perception of some dangers and highlights others."' Thus,
in line with their commitment to fair distribution of resources, indi-
viduals of an egalitarian orientation are predictably sensitive to envi-
ronmental and industrial risks, the minimization of which licenses the
regulation of commercial activities productive of disparities in wealth
and status. In contrast, individualists, precisely because they are dedi-
cated to the autonomy of markets and other private orderings, tend to
see environmental risks from commerce as low-as do hierarchists, in
line with their confidence in the competence of authorities to solve
society's problems. Hierarchists and individualists have their own dis-
tinctive anxieties-of the dangers of social deviance, the risks of for-
eign invasion, or the fragility of economic institutions-which egali-
tarians predictably dismiss!"
The patterns of risk perception posited by the cultural theory have
been powerfully borne out by empirical testing. Using sophisticated
survey instruments, Karl Dake has shown that the degree to which an
individual's cultural orientations tend toward hierarchical, egalitarian,
or individualist worldviews does in fact strongly predict that person's
attitude toward a wide range of societal risks.26 Looking specifically at
nuclear power and other technological and environmental risks, Ellen
Peters and Paul Slovic have reached similar conclusions. 7  Indeed,
these scholars have shown that cultural orientations not only explain
variance in risk perception, but explain it much more completely than
do demographic characteristics such as wealth, education, and politi-
cal-party affiliation.8  Other personal characteristics that have been
shown to explain risk perception, such as personality type and affec-
tive responses to risk-creating activities, also correlate highly with cul-
tural orientations and are thus plausibly seen as originating in them.
24 DouGi.As & WtLDAVSKY, supra note 15, at 8, 87.
25 See Wildavsky & Dake, supM note 23, at 44-54 (stating that different political cul-
tures recognize different social hazards).
See Karl Dake, Ointieng Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Atnalysis of Contem-
poraty Worldviews and Cultnrol Biases, 22J. CROSS-CUITURAL Ps'CtIiOL. 61, 70-73 (1991)
(disctissing results of a study which show that the cohural biases of participants toward
hierarchy, egalitarianism, or individualism predict their societal concerns).
27 See Peters & Slovic, supra note 14, at 1449 ("Worldviews ... appear to influence
stp)ort fir1 nuclear energy.").
2H See Wildavsky & Dake, suna note 23, at 51 ("Whether we look at knowledge,
personality, political orientation, or demographic wariables .... we find that cutltural
theory provides the best predictions of a broad range of perceived risks and an inter-
pretive framework in which these findings cohere.").
29 See l)ake, supna note 26, at 78 (presenting findings that worldviews correspond
to different personality types); Peters & Slovic, supra note 14, at 1450 ("Affect associ-
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To be sure, the cultural theory of risk does not solve all the puz-
zles associated with the diversity of risk perception. But it involves no
exaggeration to say that cultural theory comes closer to explaining
what individuals fear and why than does any other systematic account.
1I. GUNS, CULTURE, AND RISK
The cultural theory of risk supplies an extremely powerful expla-
nation of political conflict over various types of societal risks. Could it
also explain the nature and intensity of the American gun control de-
bate? We now present an empirical study designed to answer that
question.
A. Hypotheses
The gun control debate is naturally framed as one involving com-
peting perceptions of risk. Control advocates emphasize the risk that
insufficient regulation will make citizens vulnerable to deliberate or
accidental shootings, while opponents stress the risk that excessive
regulation will leave citizens unable to defend themselves against vio-
lent predation. The cultural theory of risk suggests that an individual
will select one or the other of these risks for attention depending on
how society's response to that risk coheres with that individual's
worldview.
Various forms of existing research on public opinion lend plausi-
bility to this view. The strongest predictors of attitudes toward gun
control-aside from gun ownership-are demographic: " Whites are
nearly 40% more likely than blacks; Protestants 33% more likely than
Catholics and nearly 200% more likely than Jews; and men more than
ated with images of nuclear power was systematically related to a person's world-
views.").
3) See TOM W. SMrF, 1999 NATIONAl, GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL
OPINION RESEARCH CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS 19-24 (2000) [hereinafter 1999
NATIONAl, GUN POIICY SURVEY] (describing demographic differences in gun control
attitudes), available at http://www.norc.tichicago.edu/new/gunrpt.htm; TOM W.
SMIH, 1996 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH
CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS 5-6 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 NATIONAL GUN POLICY
SURVEY] (same); Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun
Control, 39 AM. BEIIAV. SCIENTIST 387, 390, 398 (1996) (concluding that certain demo-
graphic factors predict support for gun control). Gun ownership, while a strong pre-
dictor of attitudes toward gtin control, is not a par-ticularly useful one. The most obvi-
otis reason is that it simply shifts the question firom "Why do people support or oppose
gun control?" to "Why do people own or not own guns?"
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100% more likely than women to oppose gun control. "' There are
also significant regional and community-type variations: northeast-
erners are significantly more likely than southerners and westerners,
and urban dwellers are significantly more likely than country dwellers,
to support control).32 Insofar as group membership influences the
formation of a person's values, the demographic clustering of gun
control attitudes is suggestive, if not conclusive proof, of the impact of
culture on gun-risk perceptions.'
The inference that culture is at work also gains support from his-
torical, ethnographic, and even journalistic accounts of the signifi-
cance of guns in American society. Their prominent (and in many re-
spects fabled)" role in American history has imbued guns with a
multiplicity of social meanings., Used to wrest national independ-
ence and to tame the western frontier, guns are thought to resonate as
symbols of "honor," "courage," "chivalry," and "individual self-
sufficiency."' ; These same associations also make gun possession an
3] NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., GENERAL SOCIAL. SURVEY CUMULAIVE
COIEIROOK 1972-2000, available at http://w.icpsr.unmich.edu:8080/GSS/
homepage.htm.
32 Id. It might be thought that some of these demographic labels are actually de-
scribing the same people-that those who live in rural areas are not only more likely to
oppose gtIn control, but are also more likely to be white than black and Protestant
than Jewish. Statistical models controlling for each of these demographic predictors
have shown, however, that not only do these demographic descriptors predict differing
attitudes toward gun control, but also that they do so independently of one another.
See Kleck, sun-a note 30, at 391-99 (using a multivariate analysis to study the relation-
ship between demographic factors and attitudes toward gun control); see aLso infira Part
I .C (describing the results of our regression analyses).
33 See Kleck, supra note 30, at 401 (stating that the restults of the study "support the
view that gun control support is more a product of culture conflict than a response to
crime").
34 See generally RICHARD SLOTKIN, GUNFIGHTER NATION: TE MyII-I OF TILE
FRONTIER IN TWENTIELTI-CENTURY AMERICA (1992) (examining the myth of the fron-
tier throughotut American history and its effect on political beliefs).
35 See htroduction: Guns Made Us Free-Now Wat?, in GUNS IN AMERICA 1, 8 (Jan E.
Dizard et al. eds., 1999) (disctissing the "centrality of guns in our national experience"
and "the symbolic meanings attached to them").
34 See, e.g., TONSO, sulra note 7, at 287-88 ("Just to hold [a Colt Model "P"] in
your hand produces a feeling of kinship with otir western heritage-an appreciation of
things like courage and honor and chivalry and i1he sanctity of a man's word.' (quot-
ingJEFF COOI'ER, FIGHTING HANDGUNS 31 (1958))); JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER
TI IE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 113 (1983) ("The values of
[the pro-gun] culture are best typified as rural rather than urban: they emphasize in-
dependence, self-sufficiency, mastery over nature, closeness to the land, and so on.");
B. BrtUce-Briggs, The Great Ametican Gun Wa; PUB. INT., Fall 1976, at 37, 61 ("[The gun
cuIlture's] model is that of the independent frontiersman who takes care of himself
and his family with no interference from the state."); James D. Wright, Ten Essential
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evocative token of masculinity; the custom of awarding an adolescent
boy his "first gun" has been characterized as "the bar mitzvah of the
rural WASP,"" a "veritable rite[] of passage that certifie [s] [his] arrival
at manhood. ' '38 As the tools of the trade for both the military and the
police, guns are also emblems of state authority, increasing the appeal
of owning them to individuals who hold harshly condemnatory atti-
tudes toward social nonconformists and law breakers."'
But inverting these meanings, other individuals find guns repug-
nant. Just as they signify traditionally masculine virtues to some citi-
zens, so too guns signify patriarchy and homophobia to others.0 While
some see the decision to own a gun as expressing an attitude of self-
reliance, others see it as expressing distrust of and indifference toward
others: "Every handgun owned in America is an implicit declaration
of war on one's neighbor."" ' For those who fear guns, the historical
reference points are not the American Revolution or the settling of
the frontier, but the post-bellum period, in which the privilege of
owning guns in the South was reserved to whites, and the 1960s, when
gun-wielding assassins killed Medgar Evans, John and Robert Ken-
Obseroatios on Guns in Amnerica, SOCIET'Y, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 63, 68 (explaining that for
the control opponent, the gun "symbolizes manliness, self'sufliciency, and independ-
ence, and its use is an affirmation of man's relationship to nature and to history") . See
generally S.OTKIN, sulnpa note 34 (examining historical evolution of pro-gun meanings
in American culture).
37 Bruce-Briggs, supra note 36, at 41.
Richard Hofstadter, Amenca as a Gun Culttre, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1970, at 4, 82.
See generally ARTHUR L. STINCIICOMBE ET AL., CRIME AND PUNISIMENT-
CHANGING AFITUDES IN AMERICA 106, 111-12 (1980) (drawing a parallel between
hunting and shooting cultures and those that favor summalyjustice); WRIGiHT ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 104, 118 (noting an increased rate of gun ownership among veterans,
but questioning if veteran status is itself a result of pIr0-gun socialization).
See LEE KENNEYI' & JAMES LA VERNE ANDERSON, TH E GUN IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA 214-15 (1975) (noting the historical centrality of
gun control to the women's movement); Wright, supra note 36, at 68 (stating that for
pro-control individuals, the gun "symbolizes violence, aggression, andi male domi-
nance"); H. Taylor Buckner, Sex and Guns: Is Gun Control Male Control? (Aug. 5,
1994) (tunpublished manuscript) (finding that aversion to "macho" style and tolerance
of homosexuality predict support for gun control), available at
h ttp://www.tbuckner.com/SEXGUN. HTM.
Don B. Kates, Jr., Public Opinion: The Effects of Extremist Discourse on the Gun De-
bate, in TIHE G REAI" AMERICAN GUN DEBATE 93, 109 (Don B. Kates, Jr. & Gary Kleck
eds., 1997) (citation omitted).
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nedy, and Martin Luther King, Jr. To these citizens, guns are em-
blems not of legitimate state authority, but of racism and reaction."'
From the historical and ethnographic literature, one can infer not
only that the gun control controversy is culturally grounded, but that
the cultural fault lines that divide Americans on this issue overlap sub-
stantially with the ones featured in the cultural theory of risk. The as-
sociation of guns with traditional gender roles and with state authority
should make gun control anathema to individuals of a relatively hier-
archical orientation. Those of an egalitarian orientation, in contrast,
should support gun control as a means of affirming gender and racial
equality. Persons of a relatively individualist orientation should op-
pose gun control, which they are likely to see as denigrating the ideal
of individual self-reliance. By the same token, individuals who are less
inclined toward individualism should favoi gun control in order to
express trust in, solidarity with, and collective responsibility for the
well-being of their fellow citizens. These are the hypotheses that we
decided to test.
B. Empirical Study Design
Our data source was the 1988-2000 General Social Survey (GSS).
Conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University
of Chicago since 1972, the GSS is the premier social science survey of
American public opinion.
Using appropriate questions from the survey, we constructed two
scales for measuring respondents' cultural orientations." The first
scale, hierarchy-egalitarianism, measures the degree to which a respon-
dent is inclined toward either the hierarchical worldview or the egali-
.1. See KENNE'I & ANDERSON, supra note 40, at 223-25, 231 (describing how Presi-
dent Kennedy's assassination ftieled what had been a "vague concern" over guns).
':3 See, e.g., STINCHCOMBE ET AL., stprat note 39, at 113 ("Among whites ... [g] un
owners are more likely to oppose busing [of' schoolchildren]."); Hotstadter, s'upra note
38, at 84 (noting that the gun has historically been "an important symbol of white male
status").
44 These scales desciibe relative orientations, not discrete classes of people. In
other words, we are not saying that a person is necessarily a hierarchist or an egalitarian,
an individualist or a solidatst. Indeed, it may be (and often is) the case that these
norms are competing not only within a society, but within individuals themselves as
they come into contact with social institutions that ptIsh them toward contaclictoly
approaches. We also certainly don't mean to suggest that our scales provide a detailed
understanding of' cultural variation-that requires good history and ethnography.
What our culttIral orientation scales do provide, however, are heuristic measur-es that
enable reasonable comparisons of the intluence of' ctI tn al values, relative to other
characteristics, beliefs, and experiences, on individuals' attitudes toward gtn control.
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tarian worldview, which are naturally opposed to one another. For
this purpose, we selected GSS items focusing on attitudes toward race,
sexual orientation, the military, and capital punishment."" Individuals
inclined toward an egalitarian worldview, we assumed, would express
relatively strong opposition; those of a hierarchist view, relatively
weak. We also assumed that hierarchists, because of their dedication
to conventional gender roles and their abhorrence of social deviance,
would condemn homosexuality, while egalitarians, because of their
opposition to social differentiation and their tolerance of deviance,
would not condemn it. Those of a hierarchical orientation, we pos-
ited, should have a favorable view of the military, an institution that is
symbolic both of the state's claim to authority and of conventional
gender roles. They should also support capital punishment, which is
symbolic of the state's intolerance of social deviance." Those inclined
toward egalitarianism should have a relatively negative view of the
military and oppose capital punishment for similar reasons.
The second scale, individualism-solidarism, measures the degree to
which a respondent is inclined toward an individualist worldview or an
opposing solidarist one. Although solidarism is not an orientation
that figures in previous analyses based on the cultural theory of risk,
we believe such a worldview, which we define as logically opposed to
individualism, is implicit in the cultural-theory-of-risk framework.
Making it explicit in our model facilitates the analysis by making our
measure of the individualist orientation commensurate with our
measure of the hierarchist and egalitarian ones.
For this scale, we chose GSS items in which respondents were
asked whether they believed society should be spending more or less
on a variety of regulatory and social welfare programs. ' We surmised
that those of an individualist orientation, in line with their support for
the autonomy of markets and other private orderings, would favor
spending less. In line with their dedication to collective responsibility
for the welfare of others, respondents of a solidarist orientation, we
assumed, would favor spending more.
We used a multivariate regression model to assess the influence of
cultural orientations, so measured, on attitudes toward gun control.
Regression analysis is the standard technique used in the social sci-
,5 Items used in the scale are listed in the Appendix.
46 See generally Barbara Ann Stolz, Congtess and Capital Punshent: An Exercise in
Symbolic Politics, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 157 (1983) (examining the symbolic component of,
and the possible explanations for, death penalty support).
7 tems used in the scale are listed in the Appendix.
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ences to measure the causal or functional influence of one or more
events or conditions, which are styled "independent variables," on an-
other event or condition, which is termed the "dependent variable."
Where one has reasonable theoretical grounds to believe that changes
in the former (say, the arrest rate) affect the incidence or level of the
latter (say, the crime rate), the existence of a statistically significant
correlation between the two can be viewed as confirming a causal rela-
tionship. Within a simple regression model, such a correlation is ex-
pressed as a "coefficient" in an equation that relates changes in the
independent variable to changes in the dependent variable. Where a
theory suggests that an event or condition (again, crime) can be af-
fected simultaneously by multiple influences (not just arrest rate, but
also unemployment rate and education levels), multivariate regression
analysis can be used to measure the relative size of the coefficients as-
sociated with each independent variable, and hence to indicate the
relative impact of each on the dependent variable."'s
The dependent variable in our model was the interviewees' re-
sponses to GSS gun control questions. The independent variables in-
cluded the hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-solidarism
scales, a variety of demographic and political orientation measures
used in previous analyses of public opinion toward gun control, and
respondents' expressed fear of crime."' Our hypothesis about the re-
lationship between cultural orientation and gun control attitudes pre-
dicted that the correlation between our scales and support for gun
control would be positive, statistically significant, and large relative to
the correlation between the other independent variables and gun
control attitudes.
48 See generally LARRY D. SCHROEI)ER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS
11-28 (1986) (discussing fIuctional relationships in the application of regression
analysis); Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COIUM. L. RFv.
702, 703-20 (1980) (discussing the use and application of multiple regression analysis).
49 Because of 'variation over time in items appearing in the GSS survey, we were
not able to generate complete data for every respondent in the sample. Missing data
was therefore imlputed, using Amelia: A Program for Missing Data (version 2.01, Sept.
2001), available at h ttp://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml. In studies such as the present
one, multiple imputation is considered superior to listwise deletion, pairwise deletion,
and mean substitution. See gen'ally Gary King et al., Analyzing Incomplete Political Science
Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 49, 49-50
(2001) (explaining why multiple imputation is a superior approach and adopting an
algorithm for general purpose use). Even using these other methods, however, the
cultural orientation scales exerted similar explanatory power.
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C. Results and Discussion
We ran two separate regressions, the results of which are reported
in Table 1 .51 We first regressed all the independent variables (which
are listed in the first column of Table 1), except for our cultural orien-
tation scales, against the dependent variable of support for gun con-
trol. The standardized coefficients"' generated by this analysis appear
in the second column. We then regressed all the independent vari-
ables, including our cultural orientation scales, against support for
gun control. The standardized coefficients for this analysis appear in
the third column. This approach allows us to observe not only how
much cultural orientations matter relative to other variables, but also
how much explanatory power is gained overall by adding cultural ori-
entations to the regression model. It also reveals how much of the
explanatory power conventionally associated with other variables is ac-
tually attributable to systematic variations in cultural orientations
across different social groups.
50 We perfoltrmed logistic regressions as is appropriate for analyses with binary in-
dependent variables.
51 Standardization allows the influence of independent variables-which corre-
spond to diverse characteristics that lack a common unit of measure in the real
world-to be made commensurable with each other. The standardization technique
involves computinlg each variable's coefficient in terms of how much a single standard
deviation of change in the independent variable affects the size of the dependent vari-
able. See SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 48, at 31-32 (explaining standardized coeffi-
cients and providing an example using income and family size).
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Table 1: Regression Analyses of GSS Data
Without ciuital Wiih Cittual
orienltaltiolls orieta ltlils
Female
Black
Northeast
South
West
Urball
Catiolic
.lewish
Educafion
Sociocconomic
Party Affiliatiott
Political Oriettlatioin
Fear of Crimie
I il ahty-lI gal i tmariaisil
h tt(ividttmalismtm-Soliii(1atismt
Cox & Snell R"
Observations
Note: To allow for comparison, betas have been standardized. Numbers in paren-
tMesea represent standard ero:s. * indicates p-valne < 0.05; ** indicates p-value
< 0.01; *** indicates p-value < 0.001.
As Table 1 illustrates, the cultural orientation scales generated sta-
tistically significant effects consistent with our predictions. That is, the
more egalitarian and soliclaristic an individual's worldview, the more
0.41
(0.0l3)
0.06*
((0.03)
-0.07*
(0.02)
-0..1 2 )
(0.02)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.16***
(0.03)
0. 12*1*
(0.04)
0.08**
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.03)
0. 16***
0.21"214
((0.03)
o. 17***
(0.O)3)
0.38***
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
0.04
(0.03)-(0.04
(0.03)
-0. 124***
(0.02)
(.1)5
(0.03)
0.15"**
(0.013)
0.11**
(0.04)
0.01
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.)3)
0.*0"
(0.03)
(1.11 ***
(0.03)
0.17**
(0.03)
0.18"**
(0.1)3)
0.32***
(0.03)
1.27***
(0.08)
0.080
12378
1.24***
(0.08)
0.064
12378
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likely that person was to support gun control; likewise, the more hier-
archical and individualistic the respondent's worldview, the more
likely she was to oppose gun control.
Indeed, among individuals of divergent orientations, the contrast
in attitudes toward gun control was stark. Thus, individuals who were
relatively hierarchical in their outlooks were nearly twice as likely to
oppose gun control as those who were relatively egalitarian, and indi-
viduals who were relatively individualistic were over four times as likely
to oppose gun control as individuals who were relatively solidaristic.2
Even more impressive was the predictive power of cultural orien-
tation relative to other explanatory variables. Combined, the two cul-
tural orientation scales have a bigger impact on gun control attitudes
than does any other demographic variable. Indeed, with the excep-
tion of gender, no other characteristic comes close to the explanatory
power of cultural orientations. Thus, cultural orientations have an
impact on gun control attitudes that is over three times larger than
being Catholic, over two times larger than fear of crime, and nearly
four times larger than residing in the West.
Whether one is hierarchical or egalitarian, individualistic or soli-
daristic, also matters more than whether one is conservative or liberal
or identifies oneself as a Republican or Democrat. According to the
regression analysis, the cultural orientation variables, when combined,
have well over four times as large an impact on gun control attitudes
than either party identity or political orientation. This finding is im-
portant because it demonstrates that cultural orientations are ulti-
mately not reducible to conventional political ideologies, which have
been found to be weak predictors of gun control attitudes relative to
other variables, including beliefs in the instrumental efficacy of gun
control."'
52 To estimate differerces in opposition to gun control, all other variables were set
to their mean and opposition to gun control was predicted at moderately divergent
poinLs of the two cultutral orietations distributed along seven-point scales. (This
would be similar to comparing moderate liberal and moderate conservative positions
on standard seven-point scales measuring political views.) When this was done, 44% of
inldividUalistLs and 21% of hierarchicisLs opposed gun permit laws, while only 9% of
solidarists and 12% of egalitarians opposed such laws. Of course, the divergence is
mlor'e extreme alllong those Who hold morile extrelue views.
53 See Tom R. Tyler & Paul J. Lavrakas, Suppor1.1b Gun Conrol: The Influence ?f Per-
sonal, Sociotio/ic, amd Ideological Concerns, 13,I. AiTLItI') SOC. PsYci Ioi.. 392, 394 (1983)
(demonstrating that "the political Values hypothesis suggests that support for gun con-
trol is linked to basic political values").
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Precisely because cultural orientations exert so much influence,
the demographic variables usually thought to predict gun control atti-
tudes exert considerably less influence in a model that takes cultural
orientations into account. Indeed, after cultural orientations are con-
trolled for, whether one is black, resides in the South, resides in the
Northeast, or lives in an urban area-four characteristics otherwise
very strongly correlated with attitudes toward gun control-no longer
have any significant effect."' These results suggest that the primary
demographic divisions in gun control attitudes are indeed artifacts of
divergent cultural influences. They demonstrate, too, that the hierar-
chy-egalitarianism and individualist-solidaist constructs are strong
representations of the cultural influences for which demographics are
often used as proxies.
The aim of developing a regression model, of course, is not only
to assess the relative importance of various independent variables, but
also to account for as much of the variance in the dependent variable
as possible. In this respect, a model that includes cultural orientations
is clearly superior to one that does not. Overall, our model explained
considerably more (25%) of the variation in individual attitudes to-
ward gun control than was explained by a demographics-based regres-
sion model that lacked measures of cultural orientation.
These results, in sum, strongly support our hypotheses. As is true
for a wide variety of disputes involving risk regulation, differences in
cultural orientations supply the most powerful explanation of why
Americans disagree about whether and how to regulate guns.
54 Education likewise loses any significance.
55 Conventionally, the overall power of a regression model is represented in the
"I?)" term, which expresses the total fraction of the variance in the dependent variable
explained 1)y the independent variables. See SCHROI'DER ET AL., su/pra note 48, at 33
("RH, til coefficienl of mutiple detertnination, measures the percentage of the variation in
the dependent variable which is explained by variations in the independent variables
taken together."); Fisher, suna note 48, at 720 ("The most common way of normnaliz-
ing the sandard error of estimate for different units is to compare it ... with a meas-
ure of the total variation of the dependent variable.").
56 We also ran a similar set. of tests, and obtained similar results, using the National
Election Studies (NES) year 2000 survey data sets. Again, the ctltural orientation vari-
ables predicted gun control attitudes in line with our hypotheses and were statistically
significant. Again, the cultural orientation variables substantially increased the overall
explanatory power of the regression model-this time by about 33%. And again, the
cultural orientation variables had a larger impact on gun control attitudes than did a
variety of demographic variables, most of which were statistically insignificant, pre-
sumably because of the relatively smaller size of the NES sample. Indeed, although the
overall lit of oUr model was stronger for the NES data (/ 2 = 0.213), we do not regard
the analysis of the relatively small NES samlple to he as illuiminating as our analysis of
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D. Gender, Culture, and Guns
One thing that cultural orientations, at least as we have measured
them, do not explain also bears mentioning: the impact of gender on
gun control attitudes. Cultural orientations clearly matter within a
gender. Hierarchic and individualistic men are more likely to oppose
control than egalitarian and solidaristic men, and hierarchic and indi-
vidualistic women more likely to oppose control than egalitarian and
solidaristic women. 5' However, as Table 1 reveals, the inclusion of cul-
tural orientation measures in the regression model did veiy little to
reduce the variation in attitudes across genders. Whether one is hier-
archical or egalitarian, individualist or solidarist in one's orientation,
one is still substantially more likely to favor gun control if one is a
woman than if one is a man. Interestingly, in this respect, our results
accord with the results of numerous other studies, all of which show
that gender predicts risk perception independently of cultural orien-
tation and a myriad of other influences .
But while our analysis does nothing to dispel the gender and risk
mystery, we think that our results deepen understanding of the pre-
cise character of it. It is commonly asserted that women are more con-
cerned with risk of all types-environmental and social-than are
men.59 The usual explanation for this finding is that the prospect of
accident, misfortune, or suffering is more salient for women, either
because they tend to have less political and physical power than men
and are thus more vulnerable in their daily lives, or because they are
predisposed by a combination of social and genetic factors to be more
empathetic.
Our results complicate this account. In the case of the gun con-
trol debate, the issue is not whether to accept a particular risk but
rather which of two risks-that of firearm casualties in a world with in-
the much larger GSS sample. Therefore, we omit the NES regression outpI (hut are
happy, to supply it Upon request).
When data from male and female respondents are disaggregated, cultural ori-
entations produce nearly as large an impact on the gun control attitudes of both sexes.
58 See Paul Slovic, nist, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Struying the Risk-
Assessment Batlefield, 19 RiSK ANAIysis 689, 692 (1999) ("Several dozen studies have
documented the finding that men tend to judge risks as smalier and less problematic
than do women.").
59 See id. ("Although perceived risk was inversely related to income and educa-
tional level, controlling for these differences statistically did not reduce much of the
White-male effect on risk perception.").
60 See id. ("The combination of biology and social experience has been put for-
ward as the source of a 'different voice' that is distinct to women.").
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sufficient gun control or that of personal defenselessness in a world
with excessive control-should be deemed more alarming. It is thus
inaccurate to characterize women as "more concerned with risk" in
the gun control setting than are men; rather, they are more con-
cerned than are men with the risk of being victimized by a violent or
careless gun wielder, but less concerned with the risk of being de-
prived of the power to repel a violent attack.
Similarly, it seems inadequate to attribute gender differences in
gun control attitudes to either a heightened sense of fear or a more
robust sense of empathy on the part of women. If the salience of mis-
fortune, accident, or suffering determines an individual's position on
gun control, then women are more attuned than are men to the pros-
pect of being victimized by a violent or careless gun toter, but they are
less attuned to the prospect of being deprived of a weapon that could
be used to ward off a violent attack. Women might experience greater
vulnerability than men, but such vulnerability doesn't by itself deter-
mine whether they should favor greater efforts to disarm those who
might prey on the weak or instead favor the removal of restrictions
that prevent the weak from arming themselves with guns-the "great
equalizer"-to compensate for their lack of strength.' Women, for
social and biological reasons, might be more caring then men, but for
whom should they be expected to care more-the individual who is
shot by someone whom the law might have disarmed, or the individ-
ual who might have repelled an attack had the law not disarmed her?
On reflection, moreover, it seems that the characterization of
women as being more concerned with risk than are men is no more
cogent in other settings. As in the case of gun control, most disputes
over risk in fact pit one anxiety or fear against another.2', For exam-
pie, one can say that nuclear power opponents are more concerned
with the risk of environmental catastrophe than are nuclear power
, .John l.iott considers guns "the great equalizer among the sexes," and concludes
that
[o]ne additional WOllia n carlyin g a concealed handgun reduces the murder
rate for women by al)mut 3-4 times more than olne additional man carrying a
concealed handgun reduces the murlder rate for men. This occurs because al-
lowing a woman to deteknd herself with a concealed handgun produces a
much larger change in her ability to defend herself than the change created
by providing a man with a handgun.
[,OTIr, supra note 1, at 20.
62 Indeed, this phenomenon is well known to risk-regulation experts. For a collec-
tion of essays on weighing alternative risks, see RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HIEALTIH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert
Wiener eds., 1995).
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supporters. By the same token, however, one can say that nuclear
supporters are more concerned with the risk of economic stagnation
in the event of inadequate energy supplies-a condition the brunt of
which would surely be borne disproportionately by weaker and more
vulnerable members of society. So, in opposing nuclear power to a
greater extent than do men, women are not displaying a greater aver-
sion to risk per se, but rather a greater aversion to one sort of risk and
a smaller aversion to another.
Our analysis, then, supports a recharacterization of the systematic
differences in the attitudes of women and men toward risk. Com-
pared to men's, women's concerns about risk are neither greater nor
lesser; they are just different. In all settings, some influence is making
one sort of risk more worthy of attention to women and another more
worthy of attention to men. We surmise that that influence is cul-
tural-as opposed to political or biological-given the demonstrated
power of opposing cultural orientations to focus individuals' attention
on different sorts of threats and dangers. Nevertheless, the precise
difference in values that might explain why women are concerned
with some risks and men with others seems to evade the hierarchy-
egalitarianism and individualism-solidarism framework central to ex-
isting work on the cultural theory of risk. Refining the cultural theory
of risk to account for gender differences thus remains an important
task for future study.
III. THE FUTILITY OF CONSEQUENTIAHISM
We have presented evidence that cultural orientations strongly af-
fect individual attitudes on gun control. This finding has important
implications for the gun control debate. Indeed, it suggests that the
dominant arguments in that debate are miscast.
Most participants in the gun control debate frame their positions
in consequentialist terms. "Despite intense feelings on both sides of
the gun debate," writes one prominent commentator, "everyone is at
heart motivated by the same concerns: Will gun control increase or
decrease the number of lives lost?"' ' Accordingly, economists and so-
cial scientists have dedicated themselves to amassing empirical data
aimed at determining the net impact of gun control laws on public
safety. Politicians, too, ordinarily justify their stances-whether for or
63 Lot ", suna note 1, at 21.
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against gun control-on instrumental grounds, drawing liberally on
the supportive social science studies.
What must one assume about how individuals decide to support
or oppose gun control in order for the widespread reliance on em-
pirical data to make sense? One possibility is that individuals behave
like rational utility maximizers, weighing the expected benefit of fire-
arms as instruments of self-defense against the expected cost of them
as sources of lethal accidents or (undesired) aggression. If this were
so, however, one would expect variation in violent crime-and hence
variation in the likelihood that guns will be used for violent pur-
poses-to explain a substantial amount of the variation in attitudes
toward gun control. In fact, numerous studies have found that nei-
ther actual crime rates, perceived crime rates, prior victimization, nor
fear of victimization strongly correlates with public opinion toward
gun control. '1
In any case, the "rational weigher" hypothesis seems to beg the
most important question: what determines how much weight individu-
als assign to any given piece of evidence on the consequences of gun
control? Whether permissive concealed-handgun laws promote or de-
ter violent crime has been minutely investigated and ferociously de-
bated by economists and other social scientists. Very few members of
the public possess the technical training necessary to evaluate the
quality of the conflicting empirical studies for themselves. So some-
thing independent of-indeed, prior to-their assessment of the data
64 Compare 83rd House District, Election '94, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 3, 1994, at
G23 (quoting a congressional candidate who supported "retention of the ban on as-
sault weapons and other gun-control measures as a cost-effective method of fighting
violent crime"), with Dan Balz, Moving Slowly from Hight to Center, WAS!I. P0ST, Apr. 25,
1999, at. Al ("With many Americans alarmed by the proliferation of guns, Bush de-
fended his support for legislation in Texas that allows a person to carry a concealed
weapon. 'We live in a dangerous society,' Bush said. 'People feel like they need to de-
fend themselves.'").
65 See Kenneth Adams, Guns and CGn Control, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 109, 123 (Timothy J. Flanagan &
Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) ("[F]ear of' victimization and perceptions of rising
crime rates were unrelated to gun ownership and to opinions on gun issues."); Gary
Kleck, Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control, 39 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIS'r 387 (1996) (arguing that gun control support is more a product of culuire
conflict than a response to crime based on a study indicating that support for gun
permits is generally unrelated to crime-related variables); cf. SrINCICOMBE ET AL., sit-
pra note 39, at 34-36 (measuring attitudes on gun control as remaining consistent
while crime rates became more severe). Our model, which examines the influence of
fear of crime on attitudes toward gun control, finds that fear of crime has a relatively
small effect. Supra Table I.
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must be inclining individuals to accept one empirical claim or the
other in this debate.
Another view, founded in cognitive psychology, assumes that indi-
viduals are, in effect, irrational weighers. Through a dynamic known
as the "availability heuristic," individuals are thought to base estimates
of the probability of particular events (of, say, nuclear accident or
groundwater contamination by toxic wastes) on the salience of par-
ticular instances of them-a cognitive process that often leads to sig-
nificant misestimations of the true probability of those events."; On
this account, we should expect individuals to believe that restrictions
on guns increase or decrease public safety based on how readily they
can recall examples of firearms being used to facilitate violent preda-
tion or instead being used to repel it (or perhaps being unavailable
for self-defense because of excessive regulation).
But this hypothesis, too, seems relatively weak. To begin, existing
research suggests that dramatic and highly publicized instances of gun
violence, such as the Columbine High School massacre, do not in fact
affect public opinion on gun control. 'is In addition, like the more
straightforward "rational weighing" hypothesis, the "availability" hy-
pothesis begs an important question: why do individuals more readily
recall either offensive or defensive (or perhaps thwarted defensive)
uses of guns? Stories of both sorts abound.'; ' Perhaps individuals who
66 See generally TimUr KUran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regu-
lation, 51 STAN. L. REv. 683 (1999) (stating that an availability heuristic is a mental
shortcut where the perceived likelihood of an event is frequently based on the ease
with which we can think of relevant examples).
67 See Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 41 JURIMETRICS]. 337,
350 (2001) (discussing how occurrences involving identifiable individuals are given
more weight by people than statistics); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29.J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1066-67 (2000) (discussing how erroneous informa-
tion that travels between individuals in a cascading fashion can create concern about
risks that are actually trivial).
(is See 1999 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY, supra note 30, at 12 ("However, the
idea that the shootings created a surge for gun control is not supported by the evi-
dence .... There is little indication that Littleton generally increased support for gun
control in the short term and no sign that it did so after about six months.").
Conpare Peter Annin, "You Could See the Hate," NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1991, at 35,
35 (describing the Killeen, Texas, massacre as "the worst shooting spree in U.S. his-
tory"), and Assailant Kills 3 Girls, His Bible-Study Teacher, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, July
10, 1999, at 21 (characterizing an assailant as someone who "thought it would be neat
to hurt somebody and watch them die"), with Scott Glover, Clerk Not Charged in Robbers'
Shooting, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at B3 (reporting that a jewelry store clerk fatally
shot two robbers during a botched Valentine's Day heist, and mentioning that "[t]he
owners of the jewelry store began keeping a .44-caliber handgun under the counter
after a robbery last. year"), Art Golab, Seniors Pals Hope Hes Taught 'Tieves a Lesson,
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support gun control more readily recall instances of violent predation,
and those who oppose it recall instances of heroic self-defense (or in-
stances of self-defense tragically thwarted by gun control regula-
tion)-but something independent of, and prior to, the stories them-
selves has to explain why one or the other is more "available" to
particular individuals.
In contrast with either of these views, the cultural theory of risk
posits that individuals' assessments of empirical evidence will depend
on their cultural orientation. The norms that construct their world-
views determine which risk-either that insufficient control of con-
cealed weapons will make citizens vulnerable to deliberate or acciden-
tal shootings or that excessive control will leave citizens unable to
defend themselves from attackers-appears larger or otherwise more
worthy of amelioration by law.
The psychology of risk perception posited by the cultural theory
of risk explains how individuals weigh evidence of the consequence of
control. Confronted with competing factual claims and supporting
empirical data that they are not in a position to verify for themselves,
ordinary citizens naturally look to those whom they trust to tell them
what to believe about the consequences of gun control laws. The
people they trust, unsurprisingly, are the ones who share their cultural
outlooks,7 ' and who, as a result of those outlooks, are more disposed
to credit one sort of gun control risk than the other.
The cultural theory of risk also explains what makes instances of
offensive gun use more salient for some individuals and instances of
CHI. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at 8 ("The day after 81-year-old Bruno Kosinski shot
and wounded a man he said tried to rob him, neighbors in his Ukrainian Village
neighborhood hailed him as a hero."), and Gun Control Kills Page oJ the Geog'ia Chapter
of Women Against Gun Control, at http://www.wagc-ga.com/cr-ime.html (last visited Jan.
20, 2003) (listing stories of violent crimes against unarmed victims). Indeed, examples
of )oth offensive and defensive uses often appear in the same story. See, e.g., Kevin
Sack, Southern Town Stunned by Arrests in Murder Plot, N.Y. TIMFS, Oct. 9, 1997, at AI6
(describing a situation where a sixteen-year-old student in Pearl, Mississippi, walked
into the school's commons and fired "round after round from a hunting rifle" until an
assistant principal "who was armed with his own automatic handigun" captured the stu-
dent); Jonathan D. Silver, As Long as a Month Ago, There Were Signs, PtI'T. POS'T-
GAZETI'F,, Apr. 26, 1998, at Al (reporting that a fitrteen-year-old opened fire on
classmates at a banquet hall rduring his middle school dance in Edinboro, Pennsylva-
nia, and was coaxed into surrendering his pistol by the owner of the banquet hall,
"who was cartying a shotgun").
70 Cf. Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupertj. Brown, Inteigroup Relations, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PscioHoIOY 554, 560-61 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) ("Iden-
tification with ingroups can elicit cooperative behavior even in the absence of interper-
sonal ColnlIntinlication among groutp members.").
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(successful or frustrated) defensive use more salient for others. The
cultural theory of risk posits that the norms that construct cultural
orientations operate as a mental filter, blocking apprehension of some
risks while letting others pass through. Accordingly, gun-risk stories
most "available" to an individual are the ones most congenial to her
cultural commitments.
These conclusions rest on the thesis that perceptions of gun con-
trol risk, like perceptions of various others sorts of risk, are cognitively
derivative of social norms. The cultural theory also suggests that atti-
tudes toward risk are likely to be morally derivative. Thus, an individual
might worry more about being unable to defend herself if society
takes her gun away than she does about being shot if society fails to
disarm others (or vice versa), not simply because she rates one risk as
greater in magnitude than the other but because she sees acceptance of
one or the other as demeaning or unjust.
This component of the cultural theory of risk explains additional
features of public opinion that evade the "rational weigher" and
"availability" hypotheses. A substantial percentage of people who say
they favor gun control to reduce crime, for example, also apparently
accept the proposition that stricter gun control laws would not sub-
stantially reduce crime. 7 ' Likewise, those who oppose gun control ap-
pear no more likely than those who support it to believe that gun con-
trol interferes with the use of firearms for lawful self-defense.7 2 These
findings make sense only if we assume that many individuals' attitudes
toward gun control are not based solely on their beliefs about the im-
pact of gun control on public safety.
Indeed, when justifying their positions on gun control, individuals
often acknowledge that their evaluations of gun risks are moral and
not merely instrumental in nature. Control supporters, for example,
argue that arming private citizens to deter crime would endorse a vi-
sion of "society based on an internal ... balance of terror""i -"a jun-
gle where each relies on himself for survival.",7' "[A] world with
71 See GARY KLECK, TARGETING. GUNS: FIREARMS AND TIIEIR CONTROL 338-39
(1997) (discussing polls showing that Americans who favor gun control laws simulta-
neously do not believe that such laws WillI reduce crime or violence); see also WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 36, at 235 (noting that the number of people who believe in the effec-
tiveness of gun control to reduce crime is smaller than the number of people who
support gun control).
7, 1996 NATIONAl. GUN POLICYSURVEY, supra note 30, at 8, 33 tbl.6.
73 H. Laurence Ross, Point Blank,: Guns and Violence in America, 98 AM..1. Soc. 661,
662 (1992) (book review).
7.4 RAMSEY CIARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 107 (1970).
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slightly higher crime levels," they assert, is a price worth paying to
avoid a world "in which we routinely wave guns at each other. '7v' Con-
trol opponents likewise express noninstrumental evaluations of gun
risks when they describe gun ownership as an "individual right," which
presumably cannot be subordinated to collective interests in public
safety.
76
Insofar as individual attitudes toward gun control fit the psycho-
logical profile associated with the cultural theory of risk, there is little
prospect of consequentialist arguments resolving the gun debate. In-
dividuals will simply conform-and if that is not feasible, subordi-
nate-their perceptions of what guns do to their culturally grounded
understandings of what guns tnean. In this respect, empirical gun con-
trol studies will prove as inert as empirical death penalty studies,
which individuals have been shown to credit or not, depending on
whether such studies conform to the positions individuals hold on
symbolic grounds.77
If consequentialist arguments cannot resolve the gun debate, what
kinds of arguments can? Again, those who study gun control can
learn from the experience of those who have studied other societal
risks.
Experts have traditionally advocated basing risk regulation on
narrowly consequentialist measures of environmental and industrial
hazards. Techniques such as "cost-benefit analysis" and "comparative
risk assessment" rank hazards according to a uniform expected-utility
metric. The policies they generate are defended as superior to any
based directly on public risk perceptions, the unruly character of
75 Lindsay Boyer, Letter to Editor, Who Needs a Gun?, N.Y. TIMES, june 19, 1999, at
A14.
76 See ROBERTIJ. SPIrrzR, THFi POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 17-18, 41 (2d ed. 1998)
(discussing the Second Amendment and "rights talk" with regard to the gun control
debate).
See, e.g., JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETiTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME,
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICF 239, 242-43 (1997) (describing experiments in which people
discount and ignore arguments inconsistent with their prior beliefs); Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of the
Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116 (1983) (recounting that
when respondents were asked about their position on the death penalty, they tended
to endorse all reasons consistent with their attitudes, which researchers conclude may
be "an undifferentiated emotional reflection of one's ideological selfinmage" rather
than based on a set of reasoned beliefs); Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the
Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
21, 21 (1982) (concluding that death penalty support is "one aspect of general politi-
cal-social ideology, rather than a response to crime-related concerns and experi-
ences").
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which is attributed to the public's lack of information about the haz-
ards posed by various technologies and to cognitive limitations that
distort laypersons' processing of such information.8
The inadequacy of this approach to risk regulation, however, is
well known and, by this point, largely accepted even by experts.7 ' As
the cultural theory of risk underscores, conflicting assessments of en-
vironmental and technological hazards are not primarily (or even
largely) a consequence of imperfect information or cognitive defects
but rather a reflection of the diverse social meanings that ordinary citi-
zens attach to such dangers."" Egalitarians, solidarists, individualists,
and hierarchists, then, aren't really arguing about what empirical data
to trust; they are attempting to push certain risks to the center of the
perceptual stage and to banish others to the wings because risk regula-
tion is pregnant with visions of the good society.8  Expected-utility
analysis cannot tell us whose vision-the egalitarian's, the solidarist's,
the individualist's, or the hierarchist's-is better. "Instead of being
distracted by dubious calculations, we should focus our analysis ... on
what is wrong with the state of society. ' 2 We must attend openly to
the question of what "kind of society ... we prefer to live in.
These same conclusions apply to the gun debate. Once the con-
tribution of cultural orientations is exposed, it becomes clear that
those involved in the gun control debate aren't really arguing about
whose perception of risk is more grounded in empirical reality; they
are arguing about what it would say about our shared values to credit
one or the other side's fears through law. For the individualist and
hierarchist opponents of gun control, it would be a cowardly and dis-
78 For an influential statement of this view, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOwARD EFFEcTIvE RISK REGULATION (1993).
79 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental lgulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and
the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. RFv. 941 (1999) (addressing how risk
regulation and cost-benefit analysis can vary depending on judgments such as discount
ratios for the value of a life); Slovic, supra note 58, at 689 (arguing that risk assessment
is inherently subjective and that more public participation in both risk assessment and
risk decision making would improve the quality of analysis and increase the legitimacy
of the decisions).
80 See supra Part I (discussing the cultural theory of risk, which describes how indi-
viduals evaluate risk according to context-specific norms).
81 Cf. DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 15, at 81 ("Science and risk assessment
cannot tell us what we need to know about threats of danger since they explicitly try to
exclude moral ideas about the good life."); Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 23, at 52 (de-
scribing how variations in public perception are not accounted for by knowledge).
82 DOUGI\S & WILDAVSKV, supra note 15, at 81.
83 Id. at 189.
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honorable concession to our own physical weaknesses for us to disarm
all private citizens in the interest of public safety. For the proponent
of gun control, it would send an unacceptable message of mutual dis-
trust in each other's intentions, of collective indifference to each
other's welfare, and of the legitimacy of traditional status differentia-
tions to rely on each citizen's decision to arm herself as a means of
keeping the civil peace. Just as it would be obtuse to attempt to regu-
late environmental and technological risks without regard to what ac-
cepting various risks means, so it is obtuse to think that the competing
risks associated with gun control can be evaluated without taking ac-
count of what citizens think running those risks conveys about society's
values. The only philosophically cogent way to resolve the gun control
controversy is to address explicitly, through democratic deliberations,
the question of what stance the law should take toward the competing
cultural visions that animate the gun control debate.
IV. A PLURALISTIC EXPRESSIVE IDIOM?
At least some participants in the gun control debate, of course, do
frame their appeals in explicitly cultural terms. These individuals
speak not in the technical, detached language of statistics, but in the
fiery, assaultive idiom of expressive condemnation. " Control partisans
ridicule their adversaries as "hicksville cowboys," members of the "big
belt buckle crowd"5 whose love of guns stems from their "macho,
Freudian hang-ups,86 while NRA President Charlton Heston declares
8.1 See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV.
413, 451-62 (1999) (viewing the discourse between proponenits and opponents of gun
control as permeated by "each side's illiberal ambition to proclaim its cultural and
moral ascendancy through the law").
85 Margeiy Eagan, Rally Proves Gun Lovers Are Still out There, BOSTON HERALD, May
18, 1999, at 4; see also Richard Cohen, The Tame West, WASi. POST, July 15, 1999, at A25
("[Republican11 control opponlelts] all pr-etend to be upholding American tradition
and rights, citing in some cases an old West of their fervid imagination and suggesting
remedies that can only be considered inane."); Ted Flickinger, Letter to Editor, Dodge
City, Pl'l7. POST-GAZErrEJtIne I, 1999, at A 10 ("The widespread availability of guns in
a society in which many so-called adult males still embrace the frontier mental-
ity makes it a certainty these periodic adolescent ottbursts will be tragically repeated.
It's still Dodge City out there, boys. Wahoo."); PerIy Young, We Are All to Blame,
CHAI'EL HILL HERALD, Apr. 24, 1999, at 4 ("[Wle seem crippled by a mythological
'tradition' (a frontier gun world that ceased to exist 100 years ago and was wrong even
then) and bullied into submission by a ridiculous minority of airheads like B-movie
actor Charlton Heston and the National Rifle Association.").
86 Norman W. Nielsen, Letter to Editor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at B6; see also
Jim Stingl, In the Shadow nf Littleton, NRA Refiises Scapegoat Role, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL,
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"cultural war" against "blue-blooded elitists" who threaten an "Amer-
ica... where you [can] ... be white without feeling guilty, [and] own
a gun without shame.""7
Most citizens undoubtedly find this culturally chauvinistic style of
debate exceedingly unpleasant. Indeed, it is precisely the judgmental
tone of expressive condemnation, we believe, that explains the appeal
of public safety arguments in the mainstream gun debate.
American political culture is heavily influenced by liberal dis-
course norms, which direct those engaged in public debates to dis-
claim reliance on contested visions of the good life and instead base
arguments on grounds acceptable to citizens of diverse moral out-
looks . Consequentialist modes of decision making seem to satisfy
this standard. Furnishing apparently "objective procedures and crite-
ria" for policymaking, econometrics, cost-benefit analyses, contingent
valuation studies, and the like are "decidedly divorced from state-
ments about morality.""" Because they elide contestable judgments of
value, instrumental arguments are the "don't ask, don't tell" solution
to cultural disputes in the law-not just over gun control, but over
policies like the death penalty, hate crimes, welfare reform, environ-
mental regulation, and a host of other controversial policies.:'
May 2, 1999, at 1 (describing a sign at a gun control rally stating that "[g]Un owners
have 8Penis envy").
Charlton Heston, The Second Amendment: America's tirst IFreedom, in GUNS IN
AMERICA 199, 203 (Jan E. Dizard et al. eds., 1999); see also id. (exhorting those who
"prefer the America ... where you [can] pray without feeling naive, love without being
kinky, sing without profanity, be white without feeling guilty, own a gun without
shame" to join together and "to win a cultural war"); David Keim, NRA Chief Proves Big
Draw at Vote Freedom First Rally, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 2000, at Al ("'Our
country is in greater danger now than perhaps ever before,' Heston warned. 'Instead
of Redcoats, you're fighting blue-blooded elitists."').
88 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN FTHE LIBERAL STATE 10-12 (1980)
(arguing that reasoning lacks validity if it requires a person to assert that her concep-
tion of good is better than that asserted by her fellow citizens); AMY GUTMANN &
DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 52-94 (1996) (claiming that de-
liberative democracy asks citizens to justify their beliefs with reasons that can be ac-
cepted by those around them); JOIIN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 216-22 (1993)
(stating that the idea of public reason is for people to conduct discussions on funda-
mental issues based on values that others can endorse).
89 Martin Rein & Christopher Winship, The Dangers of '"Strong" Causal Reasoning in
Social Policy, SOCIEIY, July/Aug. 1999, at 38, 39.
90 See Kahan, supra note 84, at 448 (advocating the expressive underpinnings of
the idiom of deterrence as a means to defuse "contentious expressive controvers[ies]"
inhabiting various areas of criminal law); Note, The CITES Fort Lauderdale Cfiteiia: The
Uses and Limits of Science in International Conservation Decisionmaking, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1769, 1769-70 (2001) (identifying the aim to make the decision-making process of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species more scientific and less
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If this sort of indirection were an effective strategy for suppressing
attempts at cultural domination in the law, it might be prudent to as-
sent to the continued centrality of public safety arguments in the gun
debate, notwithstanding-indeed, exactly because of-their remote-
ness from the cultural cleavages that really divide Americans on this
issue. But the hope that confining the gun control debate to empiri-
cal arguments can make the issue less contentious is, in fact, an idle
one.
As the cultural theory of risk itself illustrates, what individuals ac-
cept as truth cannot be divorced from the values and practices that
define their cultural identities. Our knowledge of all manners of
fact-that men landed on the moon in 1969; that Andrew Wiles solved
Fermat's Last Theorem; that the paternity of a baby can be deter-
mined from a DNA test-derives not from firsthand observation, but
from what we are told by those whose authority we trust. Whom we
regard as worthy of such trust (religious leaders or scientists at major
research universities; Rush Limbaugh or the editors of The New York
Times) is governed by norms that we've been socialized to accept. For
this reason, factual disagreement often signals latent political and cul-
tural conflict. If you insist that I am wrong to believe that the Holo-
caust took place, or that God created the world, you obviously aren't
reporting that your sensory experience differs from mine; you are tell-
ing me that you reject the authority of institutions and persons I natu-
rally and unquestionably respect. And for that reason, I might well
decide not merely that you are misinformed, but that you are evil."
Because the facts that individuals accept about gun control bear
exactly this relationship with their cultural identities, there is little rea-
son to think that recourse to empirics can shield us from the conflict
generated by clashing worldviews. Indeed, it seems quite obvious that
it hasn't. The mainstream empirical debate turns out to be no less vi-
tuperative than the open cultural warfare being engaged in at the
based on the specific values and goals of individual nations); Rein & Winship, supra
note 89, at 39-40 (accounting for the appeal of science as a representation of "agreed
upon procedures tot answering questions" where individual values do not play a lead-
ing role).
N Steven Shapin explains that
[i]t is at least uncivil, and perhaps terminally so, to decline to take knowledge
from authoritative sources .... Persistent distrust, therefore, has a moral
terminus: expulsion from the community. If you will not know, and accept
the adequate grounds for, what the community knows, you will not belong to
it, and even your distrust will not be recognized as such.
S'IEVEN SHIAPIN, A SOCIAL HIsToRY OFTRUTHr: CIVILrIY AND SCIE NCE IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 20 (1994).
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fringes. While predictably failing to change anyone's mind, empirical
analyses do reinforce the conviction of those who already accept their
conclusions that a rational and just assessment of the facts must sup-
port their position. The disagreement is, then, no longer seen as a re-
flection of differing visions of the good society; but an ethical battle
over acceptance of an indisputable, objective truth. Instead of chal-
lenging one another's worldviews, those who continue the debate
simply challenge one another's honesty and integrity.9
2
At the same time, consequentialism as a liberal discourse strategy
does not even succeed in vanquishing open cultural conflict. On the
contrary, it tends only to deepen the acrimonious quality of it. Most
Americans are not cultural imperialists, but as the gun debate starkly
illustrates, at least some are. For them, the liberal norm against public
moralizing lacks any constraining force. By speaking in the muted
tones of public safety in a (vain) effort to avoid giving offense, moder-
ate commentators, politicians, and citizens cede the rhetorical stage to
these expressive zealots, who happily seize on the gun debate as an
opportunity to deride their cultural adversaries and stigmatize them as
deviants.":'
In order to civilize the gun debate, then, moderate citizens-the
ones who are repulsed by cultural imperialism of all varieties-must
come out from behind the cover of consequentialisin and talk
through their competing visions of the good life without embarrass-
2 See, e.g., Kevin Beck, Letter to Editor, Conceal Carly, ST. Louis DISPATCH-I, Aug.
12, 1998, at B6 (expressing gratitude to a colmnist for "expos[ing] ProfessorJohn R.
LottJr. as an intellectually dishonest toad) of the bullet manufacturing industry," and
adding that "[g] on nuts have been in our faces lately with his alleged study saying that
not carrying a gun made our streets unsafe"); Ann Coulter, More Facts, Fewer Liberals,
HUMAN EVENTS (2001), available at hittp://wV.humanevents.org/articles/03-12-
01 /coulter.html (stating, "[w]hile having dinner recently with John Lott, author of
More Guns, Less Crime, one of life's enduring debates came up: Are liberals evil orjtUst
stttpid?" htt noting Lott himself disputes these characterizations); Larry Emory, Letter
to Editor, Gun-Coitrol Myths: Will 7ky Ever Ed, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), May
25, 2001, at A14 ("I believe it was Stalin who said, 'If you tell a lie often enough, it be-
comes the truth.' ... These people are liars. The whole gun-control hysteria is btilt.
with a fabric of lies and halftruths spread over a minimal framework of truth to give it
credibility to the uninformed and gtillible."); Patl Craig Roberts, Unarmed and Unsafe,
WASii. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A 16 ("A person can't help but wonder whether gtttt-
control advocates are uninformed fools or have a secret agenda. Once gun control
enters politics, the lying makes even Bill and Hillary Rodham Clinton blIsh.").
9)1 Cf JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA 321 (1991) ("A ... condition ... essential for rationally resolving morally
gr(utnded differences in the public realm would be the rejection by all]actions (!lie im-
pulse of public quiescence... [T]here is a tendency among those Americans in the mid-
dle of these debates to hesitate from speaking at all.").
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ment. They must, in the spirit of genuine democratic deliberation,
appeal to one another for understanding and seek policies that ac-
commodate their respective worldviews. An open debate about the
social meanings the law should express is not just the only philosophi-
cally cogent way to resolve the gun debate; it is also the only practical way
to resolve it in terms that embody an appropriate dedication to politi-
cal pluralism.
This conclusion presupposes that expressive debate in law can be
simultaneously pertinent and tolerant. The liberal anxiety that it
can't be-that the only way to avert "the domination of one cultural
and moral ethos over all others""" is to cleanse public discourse of ap-
peals to contested cultural views altogether-is far too pessimistic.
AnthropQlogists, sociologists, and comparative law scholars have in
fact catalogued many examples of comm unities successfully negotiat-
ing culture-infused controversies-between archaeologists and Native
Americans over the disposition of tribal artifacts; between secular
French educators and Muslim parents over the donning of religious
attire by Muslim schoolchildren;' and between the supporters and
opponents of abortion rights in France 7 and Germany. )5 Rather than
hide behind culture-effacing modes of discourse, the individuals in-
volved in these disputes fashioned policies expressively rich enough to
enable all parties to find their cultural visions affirmed by the law.'
94 Id. at 42.
95 See Gene A. Marsh, Walking the Spirit Trail: Ilepatrialion and Prolection (?f Native
American Remains and Sacred Cultural Items, 24 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 79, 82-94 (1992) (focusing
oil the competing interests of' archeologists and Native Americans in discovering, exca-
vating, and removing artilacLs from tribal lands); Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-
Hawk, 7he Native A meriican Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Backgrounad (id Legisla-
tive Histmy, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.]. 35 (1992) (detailing the history of the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which provides nationwide standards for the
return of ntative remains and materials froim federal institutions); see also Robert Win-
throp, Resolving Culturally-Grounded Conflict in Environmental Change 5-8 (Aug.
1999) (t1Ipublished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing culttural dispute
resolution techniqIes used to resolve conflicts over the development of sacred Native
American lands).
9 See MARc: HOWARI Ross, THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT 4-7 (1993) (recount-
ing an incident where a French school prohibited Muslim girls from wearing tradi-
tional scarves only to be overruled by an admi nistrative tribunal).
0 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION ANDl DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 15-22 (1987)
("At a minimum, one could say for the present French abortion legislation that it is a
htlane, democratic compromise.").
9S See id. at 25-33 (describing how decisions of the German Constittutional Co1ri
and legislation both contributed to striking a balance on the abortion isstte between
concerns for the pregnant woman and the fetal lite).
99 See id. at 40-50 (arguing that a consensus on the abortion issue is slowly emerg-
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We do not mean to understate the difficulty of adapting this strat-
egy of pluralistic expressive deliberations to the gun control issue.
Our society has grown so accustomed to the constraints that liberalism
places on political discourse that we seem to lack the vocabulary and
habits necessary for debating cultural issues in a constructive way.""'
When the constraining force of liberal discourse norms breaks down,
as it inevitably does, we lapse into acrimony and contempt.
This is the problem that scholars and others who want to make a
constructive contribution to the gun debate should dedicate them-
selves to solving. The construction of a pertinent yet respectful ex-
pressive idiom for debating gun control is a task that will require at
least as much energy and creativity as has been invested so far in the
study of gun control's consequences. Indeed, we imagine that an-
thropologists, sociologists, and philosophers will play a larger role in
this project than will economists.
The first step in such a project, of course, is to clarify, to the
greatest extent possible, the nature of the conflicting cultural views at
stake in the gun control debate. That has been the primary aim of the
present study.
CONCILUSION
In this Article, we have presented two claims and a plea. The first
claim was descriptive: that individuals' attitudes toward gun control
are derivative of the type of social order they prize. Simply put, indi-
viduals who are inclined toward egalitarian and solidaristic worldviews
are much more likely to support gun control than are individuals who
are inclined toward hierarchic and individualistic worldviews.
Indeed, using the methods associated with the cultural theory of
risk, we have attempted to show that cultural orientations so defined
predict a person's position on gun control more completely than does
any other fact about her. In this respect, individuals' perceptions of
"gun risks" are of a piece with their perceptions of other diverse socie-
tal risks.
ing from increased discussion); ROSS, suna note 96, at 167-200 (considering that coo-
structive conflict management with expressive communication winds up alleviating, if
not resolving, many disputes); Winthrop, su/ra note 95, at 6-8 (deailing how expres-
sive discourse in cultural conflicts allows negotiations to end at the satisfaction of both
pal-ties).
100 See HUNTER, sn'a note 93, at 34 (claiming that some conflicts are intensified
by the way they are presented in public wvith people saying things that were not their
original intent).
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The second claim was normative: those interested in resolving the
gun debate should turn their attention away from quantifying the
consequences of gun control. Because individuals' positions are de-
rivative of their cultural orientations, consequentialist arguments can-
not settle the dispute between those who favor control and those who
oppose it. The social norms that construct individuals' cultural world-
views act as a cognitive filter, causing them to credit certain risks and
supporting evidence and to dismiss others. As a result, those who
generate empirical data on gun control will always be preaching to the
choir.
Even more important, the norms that construct individuals' cul-
tural orientations invest collective responses to risks with social mean-
ing. Individuals of hierarchical and individualist orientations oppose
gun control because they believe it would be cowardly and dishonor-
able-a gesture of individual impotence-for society to disarm citi-
zens for their own protection. Egalitarians and solidarists, in contrast,
support control because to them the anxiety that control will render
individuals defenseless against predation connotes distrust of and in-
difference toward their fellow citizens, the celebration of traditional
gender roles, and racism. No amount of econometrics or cost-benefit
analysis can tell us how to respond to these risk appraisals; only a
firank and open discussion of the competing worldviews that sponsor
them can.
Our plea is that scholars of gun control turn their attention to the
project of constructing a new expressive vocabulary for carrying such
deliberations forward. As the persistent and persistently vituperative
character of the gun debate demonstrates, the emergence of a perti-
nent, civilized, and constructive discussion of the cultural values that
inform the gun debate cannot be taken for granted. Impoverished by
the influence of liberalism, our political discoursejust does not supply
us with the resources we need for a productive and tolerant discussion
about our cultural differences. Currently, our only options are si-
lence-which is what the mainstream empirical debate amounts to-
and scorn.
Remedying this problem is the task that scholars and others who
want to settle the American gun question can most profitably dedicate
themselves to. We are not in a position to say what sort of policies an
open and honest engagement of these cultural differences will pro-
duce. But we feel certain that simply addressing the gun issue in this
way, rather than in the alternately duplicitous and contemptuous way
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in which we now address it, would by itself enhance the quality of our
democratic life.
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APPENDIX: GSS ITEMS
The GSS item asking about gun control was as follows:
Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to o1-
tain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?
The GSS items included in the hierarchy-egalitarianism scale were
as follows:
[I] Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of
murder?
[2] Do you think there should be laws against marriages between
(Blacks/African-Americans) and Whites?
[3] What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex-do
you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes,
or not wrong at all?
[4] [Do you agree with the statement:] "It is mIch better for everyone
involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman
takes care of the home and family."
[5 and 6] We are Faced with many problems in this country, none of
which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of
these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you
think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about
the right amount. First (READ ITEM A) .. .are we spending too much
money, too little money, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?
[5] lmproving the conditions of Blacks
[6] The military, armaments, and defense
The GSS items included in the individualism-solidarism scale were
as follows:
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can
be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these prob-
lems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're
spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right
amount. First (READ ITEM A) ... are we spending too much money,
too little money, or about the right amount on (ITEM)?
[I ] Improving and protecting the environment
[2] Halting the rising crime rate
[3] Improving the nation's education system
[4] Foreign aid
[5] Welfare
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[6] Social Security
[7] Improving and protecting the nation's health
[8] Solving the problems of the big cities
[9] Dealing with drug addiction
[10] Mass transportation
[11] Parks and recreation
* * * * * *
